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ABSTRACT 
We present a network-based framework for simulating systemic risk that considers shock 
propagation in banking systems. In particular, the framework allows the modeller to reflect a top-
down framework where a shock to one bank in the system affects the solvency and liquidity 
position of other banks, through systemic market risks and consequential liquidity strains. We 
illustrate the framework with an application using South African bank balance sheet data. Spikes 
in simulated assessments of systemic risk agree closely with spikes in documented subjective 
assessments of this risk. This indicates that network models can be useful for monitoring systemic 
risk levels. The model results are sensitive to liquidity risk and market sentiment and therefore the 
related parameters are important considerations when using a network approach to systemic risk 
modelling. 
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CONTACT DETAILS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Systemic risk and the spread of financial contagion are important considerations for 
regulators tasked with overseeing stability of banking systems. Banking systems are at the core of 
a well-functioning financial system. A breakdown of the system would hinder economic growth, 
which in turn may cause permanent damage to the economy (Cerra & Saxena, 2017). Therefore, 
it is important for regulators to prevent such a breakdown from being triggered. Regulatory 
intervention at a late stage could prove to be costlier than intervention at an earlier stage. The 
burden of costly bailouts by the regulator are ultimately borne by the taxpayers, which negatively 
affects the economy. On the other hand, if banks are allowed to fail without any intervention, the 
economy can be strained by losses on investors’ deposits, rising interest rates, possible bank runs 
etc. Monitoring the level of systemic risk in a financial system is therefore crucial for ensuring 
long-term stability and growth of an economy. 
1.2 Liquidity and market sentiment are two key requirements for a working banking system 
that are also closely related. During times of economic distress, a lack of trust translates into a 
reluctance of non-bank financial institutions to renew funding to banks. They then impose more 
stringent lending requirements, which leads to increased risk premia on loans and debentures 
thereby increasing banks’ wholesale funding costs. The higher interest rates charged on servicing 
new debt means that additional assets may need to be liquidated to service the debt or a reduction 
in asset origination, reducing (shrinking) the balance sheet sizes of the affected banks. This puts a 
strain on those banks’ liquidity positions as the maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities 
and assets increases. Ultimately, when the funding costs become unsustainably high the bank may 
be forced to call in loans or liquidate assets prematurely. This, together with the increased funding 
costs can substantially reduce the bank’s profitability and hence its retained earnings. This in turn 
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reduces its Tier I capital, which may lead to solvency problems (Furceri & Mourougane, 2009). 
This creates a spiral of distrust. 
1.3 The complex nature of banking systems remains difficult to replicate and model precisely. 
Bottom-up approaches using integrated modelling frameworks are very useful, yet they are 
difficult to calibrate, expensive and not readily available. This is because in practice, such an 
approach would involve the regulator providing a specified scenario to all banks, after which the 
banks quantify their own risk position so that the regulator can then aggregate the risk positions 
(Borio, Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014). It is therefore of interest to find simplified models that 
consider the entire system from the start and can detect changes in systemic risk. We contribute to 
this by showing that network models of systemic risk can satisfy this requirement to a large extent. 
We illustrate how such a top-down model can be used, by applying it to real-world balance sheet 
data and showing that changes in risk are detected under times of market stress for various network 
structures. We turn our attention to problems in rolling forward short-term debt that is caused by 
frictions such as a lack of trust in the system. 
1.4 The chain of events that we aim to model is as follows: One bank in the system experiences 
solvency problems, which may arise because of a significant increase in impairments from non-
performing loans. This could be because of a number of causes such as unsustainable lending 
practices or a disruption in its target market (such as the mine closures experienced in South 
Africa). It is important to note that the applied model does not require us to specify the event that 
leads to the initial bank’s default, nor do we attempt to model it. The equity of the aforementioned 
bank then declines, and shareholders need to absorb the losses (followed by other subordinated 
creditors). Now there are two key potential effects on the banking system. Firstly, other banks’ 
balance sheets may be affected through a revaluation of assets and impairment provisions and they 
may need to raise additional impairment provisions (e.g. if the initial bank’s troubles were due to 
increased impairments on a specific type of loan book, other banks may need to raise their 
impairment provisions for similar books to account for an anticipated rise in impairments). 
Another possibility is that the bank may ultimately need to resort to forced sales to generate 
liquidity. The increased supply of those assets in the market may depress their market value, 
leading to some (albeit limited) mark-to-market losses for other banks holding similar assets. For 
this study, the distinction between these possibilities (and hence the effect of the initial default on 
the banking or trading books of other banks) is not explicitly made. Here, we assume a net 
reduction in the balance sheets of other banks takes place which could be due to an increase in 
required reserves, or to a combination of this and mark-to-market losses. This approach is adopted 
to keep the model simple and consistent with existing models in the literature (see for example 
Nier et al. (2008), Gai & Kapadia (2010), May & Arinaminpathy (2010) Arinaminpathy, Kapadia 
& May (2012)). It is worthwhile to note that the narrative of these papers focusses on the fire-sale 
aspect of this contagion mechanism. However, as this is a practical application within a specific 
financial environment, we include losses due to raised provisions on the banking book in this 
mechanism as well. The second effect of the initially troubled bank affects the liability side of 
other banks’ balance sheets and is more likely to lead to contagion. Funders’ trust in the ability of 
banks to service their debt may decline as they become incapable of distinguishing between 
financially sound and troubled banks. This leads to liquidity issues, as the cost of rolling forward 
short-term debt increases for the affected banks as non-bank financial institutions are reluctant to 
renew their loans. Banks need to roll forward their short-term debt as they usually invest in long-
term assets and take short-term deposits from funders. This gives them the needed liquidity at a 
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low funding cost under normal circumstances. Banks may then be forced to sell assets below their 
market value to generate liquid funds and avoid maturity mismatches on their balance sheets.  
1.5 As a top-down model, we propose the application of network theory. It has been applied in 
a wide variety of disciplines including sociology, computer science, epidemiology, biology, 
economics and finance. Network models of systemic risk have been developed in the literature 
over the past decade (see Upper & Worms (2004) and Chinazzi & Fagiolo (2013) for surveys). It 
involves representing the banking system as a network of interconnected agents, where interactions 
between banks are modelled explicitly. Allen & Babus (2008) explain why network theory is a 
useful tool for understanding and analysing systemic risk in financial systems and provides a 
meaningful way of analysing connections between them. They argue that network theory is 
instrumental in investigating financial stability by considering how a single institution can cause 
risk to the entire system. As shown by Georg (2011) and Ladley (2013), network theory can also 
be used to investigate the effect of common system-wide shocks. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 BACKGROUND TO NETWORK MODELS 
2.1.1. A network is a system of 𝑁 interacting agents (called nodes), where the interactions 
between them form links between the nodes (called edges). It can be represented as graph, which 
is a pair 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), where 𝑉 = {1,2, … , 𝑁} denotes the collection of nodes and 𝐸 = {{𝑖, 𝑗}} is the 
collection of edges. An edge {𝑖, 𝑗} is a collection of two nodes 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉 that are connected via a link 
in the network. In this application, we use directed graphs. Here, the collection {𝑖, 𝑗} is ordered and 
each edge starts at the first node 𝑖 and ends at the second node 𝑗. Figures Figure 1 and 2 below 
illustrate the difference between undirected and directed graphs. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of an undirected graph 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of a directed graph 
2.1.2. A commonly used method of modelling the edges between nodes is based on one 
of the earliest probability models of a graph, studied by Erdӧs & Rényi (1959). Here, each edge in 
the network is present with a fixed probability 𝑝, referred to as the Erdӧs-Rényi probability. The 
resulting graph is called an Erdӧs-Rényi network. It can be used for both directed and undirected 
graphs. We compare this model with extensions of it where the probability that a directed edge 
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exists from node 𝑖 to 𝑗, 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗), is dependent on the nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗. Note that for this application, 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑖) = 0 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉, and it is said that the graph does not contain any loops (i.e. an edge cannot 
start and end at the same node). 
2.1.3. The banks are represented by nodes and the paths through which the problems of 
one bank spill over to others are represented by the edges. The edges need to be directed to take 
account of the direction in which the losses propagate through the system. The interpretation of 
the edges as mechanisms through which uncertainty is channelled is discussed further in section 
3.2. 
2.1.4. The average probability that any node 𝑖 is connected to another node 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 is given 
by ?̅? =
1
𝑛(𝑛−1)
∑ 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑖≠𝑗 . It can be used as a measure of the interconnectedness of a network. We 
also use it to standardise different extensions of the Erdӧs-Rényi network as described in Appendix 
C. The transmission of losses in the network as described in section 3.2 makes use of nodes’ 
shortest paths. The shortest path from a node 𝑖 to another node 𝑗, say 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗), is the smallest number 
of edges that can be used to travel from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗. It is used as a measure of distance between 
two nodes in a network and takes account of the edge directions. 
2.1.5. The way that banks are connected to one another via edges in a network is referred 
to as the structure of the network. Real-world systems are often more complex than purely random 
networks such as the standard Erdӧs-Rényi network (Kim & Wilhelm, 2008). They often exhibit 
characteristics such as low average shortest paths and nodes that are clustered together (called the 
small-world property). The Watts-Strogatz model (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) can be used to generate 
such a network. Other commonly used network models include those where nodes have a power 
law distribution of the number of edges connected to them (referred to as a power law degree 
distribution). The Barabásie-Albert model (Albert & Barabásie, 2002) can be used to generate 
networks with this property. 
2.1.6. Such power law distributions are of interest to large networks which that may 
exhibit this behaviour (Boss et al., 2004, Gabrieli, 2011, Santos & Cont, 2010, Cont, Moussa & 
Santos, 2012). For smaller networks such as the South African system, a power law distribution is 
theoretically unsuitable and difficult to test for. This paper addresses this shortcoming by 
investigating network structures that are applicable to smaller networks. We restrict ourselves to 
models where the probabilities 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) are functions of properties of the nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗. This is done 
firstly to enable us to test a wide variety of structures that are comparable to one another, since 
they are simulated in a similar way. Secondly, since the 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) probabilities are dependent on the 
nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗, it enables us to explicitly take account of differences between banks. Finally, models 
with power law degree distributions do not make much sense for networks with few nodes such 
the one we consider here. 
2.2 RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.2.1. Methods for measuring systemic risk can generally be categorised according to 
whether they are based on market information (i.e. asset prices) or balance sheet information. The 
studies by He & Krishnamurthy (2014) and Hautsch, Schaumburg & Schienle (2015) are examples 
of the former, whilst network models usually make use of balance sheet information. As methods 
based on market information rely on assumptions of market efficiency, this must be taken into 
account when interpreting the results, which is not the case for balance sheet driven models. 
Another advantage of using balance sheet data is that it is possible to separate the effects of 
systemic risk from any mitigating actions by regulators, whereas asset prices usually implicitly 
take account of the possibility of regulatory intervention (Birchler & Facchinetti, 2007, Alessandri 
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et al., 2009). Network models have a further advantage of emphasizing the ways in which banks 
influence one another. Such models provide a clear distinction between individual entities and the 
financial network as a whole (Bisias et al., 2012).  
2.2.2. It is common for network models of systemic risk to have the edges between the 
nodes represent interbank assets and liabilities. Such models assume that whenever a bank in the 
system defaults, it cannot honour its commitments to its creditors, and hence defaults on its 
interbank commitments. We note that in the South African banking environment, the hierarchy of 
interbank loans compared to other unsecured debt is not well-defined. Therefore, in the event of a 
bank’s default, other unsecured liabilities may be subjected to bail-in before interbank liabilities. 
That is why we take a different approach in this study, and do not model the interbank lending 
relationships.Instead, we consider contagion mechanisms applicable to any jurisdiction, namely 
how a loss of trust in the market may spill over to other banks, creating uncertainty and a difficulty 
to roll forward short-term debt. 
2.2.3. Regardless of what the edges represent, network models are flexible enough to be 
used in a range of different circumstances. For example, Markose, Giansante & Shaghaghi (2012) 
investigate the network of exposures generated by credit default swaps of the United States of 
America, Battiston et al. (2012) study the loans generated by the US Federal Reserve Bank 
emergency loans program, and Garratt, Mahadeva & Svirydzenka (2011) consider international 
banking exposures. 
2.2.4. When modelling systemic risk in financial systems, it is important to include other 
channels of contagion such as market liquidity risk (Upper, 2011). Chen, Liu & Yao (2016) find 
that market liquidity risk has a significant effect on systemic risk in a network setting. Network 
studies of systemic risk that incorporate market liquidity risk include those by Gai & Kapadia 
(2010), Roukny et al. (2013) and May & Arinaminpathy (2010), while Gai, Haldane & Kapadia 
(2011) focus on funding liquidity risk by incorporating haircuts to short term debt. 
2.2.5. We explicitly account for this by including factors representing market liquidity 
risk for short-, medium- and long-term assets. Short-term assets are defined to have a maturity of 
less than a month, and medium-term assets a maturity of more than a month and less than a year. 
Assets with a maturity of more than a year are deemed long-term. Network models generally 
assume simplified balance sheet structures to facilitate the modelling of key balance sheet 
components (see for example Nier et al. (2008), Gai & Kapadia (2010), Arinaminpathy, Kapadia 
& May (2012) and Cont, Moussa & Santos (2012)). A similar approach is taken by this study, with 
the simplified balance sheet illustrated in Table 1. The modelling of all channels of contagion is 
explained in section 3.2. 
Table 1. Illustration of a simplified balance sheet 
Assets Equity & liabilities 
Short-term assets Capital 
Medium-term assets Other equity & liabilities 
Long-term assets  
2.2.6. One difficulty arising from network models is the specification of the links between 
banks, since it is not possible to determine the paths through which losses will spread. Empirical 
network studies that focus on interbank lending as the direct contagion channel can use maximum 
entropy estimation techniques to estimate connections between banks (Upper & Worms, 2004). 
However, this estimation method can lead to inaccuracies when assessing systemic risk (Mistrulli, 
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2011) and makes use of each bank’s total interbank assets and loans. It is therefore not appropriate 
to use this for our contagion mechanism. 
2.2.7. The process of deciding which banks to connect to one another should consider the 
definition of the edges in the network. For this to make sense, the formation of edges should ideally 
be consistent with the event that initiated the contagion in the first place. For example, banks that 
are heavily exposed to the mining sector may experience a loss of investor sentiment as a result of 
sudden mine closures. From a modelling perspective, it is impractical to try to account for all 
possible bottom-up contagion events, seeing that this would need to cover a wide range of 
exposures and their associated risks. For this reason, we consider a range of different top-down 
network structures when modelling systemic risk. Furthermore, we note that different network 
structures may exhibit different levels of risk and the effect of changes to network characteristics 
is dependent on the chosen structure (Gai, Haldane & Kapadia, 2011, Georg, 2011, Krause & 
Giansante, 2012). As the true network structure is unknown, it is important to investigate how 
changes in the structure can affect the modelling of systemic risk. 
2.2.8. The structures investigated here are explained in section 3.3, some of which 
facilitate the modelling of core-peripheral networks. These are networks that consist of a small 
number of tightly connected ‘core’ banks and numerous sparsely connected ‘peripheral’ banks. 
Iori et al. (2008) and Fricke & Lux (2015) find evidence that real-world interbank networks exhibit 
this behaviour (Hüser, 2015, Glasserman & Young, 2016). Even though we do not model interbank 
lending relationships, it is possible that losses due to investor sentiment follow a similar pattern. 
Therefore, such structures are included for consideration in this study. 
2.2.9. We contribute to the growing body of empirical analyses of banking networks (see 
e.g. the work by Georg & Brink (2011), Huang, Zhou & Zhu (2012), Vallascas & Keasey (2012), 
Upper & Worms (2004), Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) and Boss et al. (2004) to name but a few) 
by applying a network model of market sentiment to South African bank balance sheet data. The 
results of the model are used to assess whether the model can be used to monitor systemic risk 
levels by capturing increases in systemic risk during stressed market conditions. This is done by 
considering systemic risk at different points in time during which incidents occurred that adversely 
affected the local economy. 
2.2.10. As the focus of this paper is on network mechanisms alone, it does not incorporate 
central bank activity or macro-economic factors. This is because their influence on the results 
would obscure effects relating to the network model itself and the differences in network structure. 
Central bank activity needs to be excluded as this research is done from the regulator’s point of 
view and its reaction to bank failures are impossible to predict beforehand. The results would 
therefore be skewed by any assumptions made regarding central bank responses. From a practical 
perspective, regulators assessing policy responses to banking crises should compare the cost of 
intervention to the cost of not intervening, since both options can bear a high cost (Furceri & 
Mourougane, 2009). A useful area of future research would be to consider a set of policy responses 
and investigate how the network structure affects the risks borne by various stakeholders such as 
depositors, taxpayers and other banks. One can then consider the risk borne by each stakeholder 
when the risk is ignored and when the regulator intervenes. While it is possible and desirable to 
embed network models into larger macro-economic models (see for example Georg & Poschmann 
(2010) and Aikman et al. (2009)), it is specifically excluded here since one aspect of the study is 
to assess the performance of pure network models. Therefore, as this is a gross risk assessment, 
the inclusion of macro-economic effects may influence the conclusions unduly. 
2.2.11. To summarise, this paper aims to make the following contributions: 
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(a) A top-down network approach is used to model systemic risk over time in the South 
African banking system. We investigate whether this model is capable of monitoring 
systemic risk by detecting instances of market turmoil. 
(b) We introduce a novel contagion mechanism that focuses on market sentiment.   
(c) The effect of the network structure on the results is investigated. Since the actual network 
structure is unknown, it is important to obtain insight into how sensitive the results are to 
the choice of network structure. 
2.2.12. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3 explains how the 
balance sheets are constructed, discusses the modelling procedure, and presents the different 
network structures. The results obtained by applying the model to the South African system are 
presented in section 4, after which section 5 concludes. 
3. DATA AND NETWORK DESCRIPTION 
3.1 DATA AND BALANCE SHEET CONSTRUCTION 
3.1.1. Standardised monthly bank balance sheet data1 of South African banks are used 
from April 2015 to March 2017. The BA900 returns are not granular enough to allow the extraction 
of CET1 capital data, which was instead obtained from banks’ annual statements, Pillar III capital 
disclosures and the Orbis Bank Focus database2. It is not sensible to use a period dating back 
further since the capital data becomes too scarce. Capital data before 2015 is difficult to obtain for 
all banks, since numerous small banks either did not exist, or their capital data for earlier periods 
is simply not available in the public domain. 
3.1.2.  As at March 2017 there were ten locally controlled banks, three mutual banks, six 
foreign controlled banks and fifteen branches of foreign banks, making up a total of 34 registered 
banks. For the purpose of this investigation, we do not consider the parent companies of the foreign 
branches. Firstly, subsidiaries may not be supported by the parent company. Secondly, while the 
assumption may under- or overestimate systemic risk in the local banking sector if subsidiaries 
were supported by the parent (depending on the solvency position of the parent company), it is 
necessary in order to keep the system closed. In other words, to ensure that risk levels within the 
system are not influenced by external market players, any actions that they may take or any 
regulations that may apply to them. This banking system can be considered as a typical candidate 
for a core-peripheral structure, as it consists of five large, ‘core’ banks and 29 smaller banks. To 
illustrate this, the total asset values of the banks are shown graphically in Appendix A, Figure A.1. 
For this study, eight banks are excluded because of a lack of capital data (more detail is given in 
¶¶3.1.7 and 3.1.9 below), leaving 26 that are included in the analysis. The process for composing 
the simplified balance sheets as illustrated in Table 1 is explained below. 
3.1.3 On the asset side, items are categorised according to whether they have a short, 
medium or long time to maturity at inception. Recall that short-term assets have a maturity of less 
than a month, medium-term assets have a maturity of more than a month and less than a year, and 
long-term assets have a maturity of more than a year. Assets that do not have a contractual maturity 
date are categorised according to their expected holding period, for example remittances in transit 
which are categorised as medium-term. Not all balance sheet items fall distinctly into only one 
category. Most of these items are placed into the category in which most individual assets are 
                                                          
1https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/Banking%20sector%20ata/Pages/Banks-
BA900-Returns.aspx 
2 https://orbisbanks.bvdinfo.com/version-2017713/home.serv?product=OrbisBanks 
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expected to fall. For example, the local Treasury Bills can have maturities ranging from one day 
to twelve months, but normally have an unexpired maturity of 91 days or 182 days. Therefore, 
these are categorised as medium-term assets for our purpose. There are two exceptions to this rule: 
– Marketable government stock on the BA900 forms (line item 198) is only given with a 
maturity of up to three years, and a maturity of over three years. Marketable government stock 
with a maturity of over three years are included in the long-term asset category. Marketable 
government bonds with a maturity of up to three years are assumed to be equally distributed across 
short-, medium- and long-term assets as all three of these maturity categories are included in this 
line item.  
– Derivatives are divided according to term on the liability side of the BA900 forms, but not 
on the asset side. The assumption is therefore made that on the asset side of each bank, the 
proportion of short-term derivatives to total derivatives is the same as on the liability side. The 
same assumption holds for the medium- and long-term derivative instruments. If there are no 
derivatives on the liability side, the derivatives on the asset side are divided equally among the 
short-, medium- and long-term assets. 
3.1.4 Derivative exposures constitute an important source of systemic risk because 
increased margining requirements during stress scenarios can place excessive strain on banks’ 
liquidity positions. While this can be modelled using a network approach (see e.g. the study by 
Markose, Giansante & Shaghaghi (2012)), we do not explicitly model these exposures, but include 
such effects indirectly via the trust mechanism. This is because counterparty relationships are not 
publicly available, and it avoids complicating a model that is meant to remain simple. 
3.1.5 Credit impairments with respect to loans and advances are deducted from the 
medium-term assets. This is because private sector loans and advances (that are categorised as 
medium-term assets) generally make up a large portion of total loans and advances and should also 
contain the majority of impaired accounts. Any impairments in respect of investments are deducted 
from the long-term assets since investments are generally regarded as long-term assets. The 
categorisation of assets is illustrated in Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
3.1.6 Note that with more granular data the categorisation of assets according to maturity 
can be done more precisely. In this case it is necessary to aggregate the balance sheet items at this 
level since the available detail does not allow for a finer categorisation according to term. 
Regulators with more detailed information could use a larger number of categories so that assets 
can be grouped according to more time horizons and other characteristics as well. 
3.1.7 A banks’ Common Equity Tier I (CET1) capital represents the capital part of the 
balance sheet for the purpose of this investigation. This is because problems in financial systems 
can spread rapidly, and the CET1 capital can quickly be converted into cash (Gai & Kapadia 2010). 
(The same approach is used by Wells (2004), Mistrulli (2011) and Cont, Moussa & Santos (2012).) 
Additional Tier 1 capital is excluded since these must first be converted in the event of a crises. 
The equity side of the BA900 balance sheets is not sufficiently granular to allow for calculation of 
the banks’ CET1 capital. For this reason, data from financial statements, published Pillar III capital 
disclosures and Orbis Bank Focus is used to supplement the primary balance sheet information. 
However, the data obtained via these sources are quarterly at best (in some cases only annually) 
and not all banks publish these on the same dates. Furthermore, some banks publish only risk 
weighted CET1 ratios and do not necessarily include a monetary amount for this type of capital. 
The available data for this part of the balance sheet must therefore be used to estimate the missing 
data points where possible. 
3.1.8 To estimate a bank’s monthly CET1 capital, the available CET1 amounts are 
divided by the corresponding total asset values of the respective bank at the available points in 
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time. In other words, if 𝐾𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡 denote a bank’s CET1 capital and total asset value at time 𝑡 
respectively, we calculate 𝐶𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐴𝑡
 for all months 𝑡. This gives an unweighted ratio of CET1 to total 
assets at selected points in time. There are two main reasons for using this ratio. It firstly strips out 
any inflationary effects over time and secondly removes the effect of significant increases or 
decreases in banks’ growth rates. Where available, the unweighted ratio of CET1 to total assets 
are very stable for all banks over the period considered (the maximum variance for this ratio for 
over all banks is 0,00344). Therefore, for most banks the missing unweighted CET1 ratios could 
easily be estimated. 
3.1.9 Table B.2 in Appendix B shows all the unweighted CET1 ratios for registered local 
banks that could be obtained from the available data. For each bank that has at least three CET1 
data points available between May 2017 and February 2015, the remaining ratios are estimated for 
the outstanding months. Banks that have less than three CET1 data points are excluded from the 
analysis, reducing the total number of banks from 34 to 26. The total assets of all excluded banks 
make up less than 3% of all banks’ assets as at May 2017. 
3.1.10 For the remaining banks, the available unweighted CET1 capital ratios are used to 
estimate the unknown CET1 ratios as follows: 
– Where missing data points fall in-between two known data points, linear interpolation 
between the two known data points is used to estimate the missing values. For example, if 
the ratios 𝐶𝜏 and 𝐶𝜏+3 are available for months 𝜏 and 𝜏 + 3, but ratios for months 𝜏 + 1 
and 𝜏 + 2 are not, we use the estimates ?̂?𝜏+𝑘 = 𝐶𝜏 +
𝑘(𝐶𝜏+3−𝐶𝜏)
3
 for 𝑘 = 1, 2. 
– Where a missing data point does not lie between two known data points, the average 
unweighted CET1 ratio for the associated bank is taken. For example, if no CET1 data is 
available for month 𝑡 = 1, then ?̂?1 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝐶𝜏𝜏 , where 𝑚 is the number of months 𝜏 for 
which 𝐶𝜏 is available and the sum is taken over all available ratios 𝐶𝜏. 
3.1.11 Once the estimates ?̂?𝑡 for the CET1 capital are determined, all the required balance 
sheet entries are known. The next step is then to specify the interactions between the banks that 
are represented by the edges, where different assumptions regarding these interactions lead to 
different network structures. 
3.2 NOTATION AND DEFAULT CASCADES 
3.2.1 The modelling procedure is based on the work of May & Arinaminpathy (2010). In 
this section the month 𝑡 is fixed, and therefore subscripts relating to the month are not included as 
in section 3.1. Suppose a network consists of 𝑁 banks, where each bank 𝑖’s total assets are denoted 
by 𝑎𝑖. The short-, medium- and long-term assets of a bank 𝑖 are denoted by 𝑎𝑖
(𝑠)
, 𝑎𝑖
(𝑚)
 and 𝑎𝑖
(𝑙)
 
respectively. Finally, bank 𝑖’s CET1 capital is denoted by 𝑐𝑖. For ease of reference, the terms CET1 
capital and capital will be used interchangeably for the remainder of the paper. 
3.2.2 We choose an initial bank 𝑛 and suppose that it suffers an initial loss. For the 
purpose of this paper, such an event is called an ‘initial shock’ since we assume that it was a 
significant and unexpected event. In this event bank 𝑛 loses a fraction, say 𝑠, of its assets. If 𝑠 ∙
𝑎𝑛 > 𝑐𝑛, it fails, and the shortfall causes friction in the market. It is noted that the bank might not 
technically be insolvent at this point but might rather be in liquidation. However, for our purposes 
it is excluded from the network, and hence the distinction between liquidation and insolvency is 
not required. 
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3.2.3 Now three effects come into play. Firstly, the regulator may require other banks to 
assist with capitalisation in order to limit the spread of losses to other parts of the economy by 
making whole the retail and institutional creditors’ unsecured loans. We assume that a proportion, 
say 𝑢, of this shortfall must be covered by the remaining banks. The remaining proportion 1 − 𝑢 
is absorbed by the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) part of the troubled bank’s balance 
sheet, after which unsecured creditors bear the loss. The resulting funding requirement is spread 
over all banks in the system in proportion to their asset sizes. In other words, if bank 𝑛 experiences 
an initial loss event, its capital is reduced by 𝑆𝑛 = 𝑠 ∙ 𝑎𝑛. If 𝑆𝑛 ≥ 𝑐𝑛, then 𝑛 defaults and each bank 
𝑖 suffers a loss of 
𝐿𝑖
(1)
= 𝑢(𝑆𝑛 − 𝑐𝑛) ∙
𝑎𝑖
∑ 𝑎𝑘
. 
3.2.4 Secondly, we include losses due to raised provisions and mark-to-market effects. 
For each remaining bank in the system, the reduced value of the short-term assets is given by 
𝑎𝑖
(𝑠)
∙ exp(−𝑔(𝑠)), 
where 𝑔(𝑠) is a parameter associated with the reduction of value for the short-term assets. This is 
a commonly used method in the systemic risk literature for modelling changes in asset prices due 
to changes in supply and demand (Cifuentes, Ferrucci & Shin, 2005, May & Arinaminpathy, 2010, 
Gai & Kapadia, 2010, Nier et al., 2008). 
3.2.5 The medium- and long-term assets are reduced in the same way, where the 
associated parameters are given by 𝑔(𝑚) and 𝑔(𝑙). This implicitly assumes that all banks in the 
system hold similar classes of assets, which is generally not the case. However, to avoid over-
complicating the model we make the simplifying assumption that all banks will be affected to the 
same degree. Each of these parameters represents the expected effect that the insolvency of a bank 
would have on the assets in the system. It is referred to as liquidity losses or liquidity shocks for 
the remainder of this paper as the methodology is similar to the liquidity shocks presented by e.g. 
Nier et al., (2008). The associated parameters are referred to as liquidity reduction parameters. At 
this stage each bank 𝑖 in the system experiences a liquidity loss of  
𝐿𝑖
(2)
= ∑ 𝑎𝑖
(𝜂)
∙ exp(−𝑔(𝜂))
𝜂∈{𝑠,𝑚,𝑙}
. 
3.2.6 Finally, we include losses due to a deterioration in market sentiment. The perceived 
exposure of other banks to the problems faced by bank 𝑛 determines the edges in the network. An 
edge starting at a bank 𝑗 and pointing towards bank 𝑛 means that the market believes 𝑗 may be 
exposed to similar difficulties as 𝑛, or may be adversely affected by the default of 𝑛. The edges in 
the network are assumed to be random, and the different structures are discussed further in section 
3.3. Recall that the shortest distance between two nodes is the smallest number of edges that can 
be used to travel from the one to the other. The shortest distance 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑛) in the network from any 
bank 𝑖 to the failing bank 𝑛 determines the degree to which 𝑖 is affected by a loss of trust. Small 
values of 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑛) indicate ‘closeness’ in the network, which represents a perceived tendency for a 
bank 𝑖 to experience similar problems as 𝑛. In order to reflect the shrinkage of a bank 𝑖’s balance 
sheet due to increased funding costs and any resulting forced sales, each asset class of bank 𝑖 is 
reduced by a factor exp (−
𝛿
𝑑(𝑖,𝑛)
). Therefore, each remaining bank 𝑖 in the system experiences a 
further loss of  
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𝐿𝑖,𝑛
(3) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
(𝜂)
∙ [1 − exp (−
𝛿
𝑑(𝑖, 𝑛)
)]
𝜂∈{𝑠,𝑚,𝑙}
, (1) 
where 𝛿 is the associated reduction factor. Similar to the parameters 𝑔(𝜂) for 𝜂 ∈ {𝑠, 𝑚, 𝑙}, different 
proximity factors should be assigned to different types of assets when applying this model in 
practice. However, we avoid introducing too many parameters for the purpose of illustration by 
using the same parameter for all asset classes. 
3.2.7 This type of loss is called a proximity shock for the remainder of the paper, as it is 
related to the distance between banks in the network and avoids confusion with losses arising from 
the devaluation of assets following the default of a bank. Proximity shocks aim to capture the 
consequences of the market’s sentiment following a bank’s default. The reaction of the market will 
typically depend on the circumstances surrounding the default and therefore it is preferred to take 
a generalised modelling approach to capture the effects of market sentiment. For example, 
following the curatorship of African Bank, some of the larger banks received credit downgrades 
from Moody’s which increased their cost of borrowing. The reason given for the downgrade was 
that while the reserve bank did mitigate contagion risk by issuing a bailout, some creditors were 
allowed to suffer losses and hence Moody’s was of the view that there is a “lower likelihood of 
systemic support from South African authorities to fully protect creditors in the event of need”3. 
Other examples include the banking crisis in Greece which saw a run on the banks that negatively 
affected banks’ liquidity positions, and the European sovereign debt crisis which resulted in credit 
downgrades and increased costs of borrowing. Instead of restricting ourselves to particular 
scenarios, we consider a wide range of possibilities regarding the spread of distrust in the system. 
This is done by simulating network paths according to the structures presented in section 3.3, 
which avoids the need to consider the circumstances surrounding the initial default. This approach 
implicitly assumes that distrust in the system is only initiated after a default, and that banks of 
equal distance to the defaulting bank will experience losses of a similar degree. The 
appropriateness of the first assumption depends on the circumstances surrounding the default, and 
whether the market was aware of any friction within the system beforehand. The second 
assumption is unlikely to hold in practice but is required to keep the model simple and tractable. 
Finally, the model makes the underlying assumption that the loss of market sentiment due to a 
bank’s failure is independent of the failed bank’s size. In practice, it is expected that the failure of 
bigger banks will affect market sentiment more adversely than that of smaller banks. However, it 
is not straightforward to determine the magnitude of such differences, and the resulting effects 
may obscure the network implications that we aim to investigate in this paper.  
3.2.8 The way that proximity shocks are modelled in the network accounts for the fact 
that some banks will experience a worse loss of confidence than others. From equation (1) it is 
seen that banks with smaller shortest distances to the failing bank will experience worse losses 
than those with greater shortest distances. This is illustrated in Figure 3 below, where the failing 
bank is indicated by the cross. The darker nodes experience greater losses than the lighter node, 
since they have a smaller shortest distance to the failing bank. The edges in the network is directed 
to take account of a wide range of possibilities without overcomplicating the model. In some 
circumstances the default of one bank may lead to distrust in another bank, but not the other way 
around. For example, the default of a large, systemically important bank may affect the market’s 
perception of small banks, but the default of a small bank may not necessarily affect the perceived 
                                                          
3 https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-four-South-African-banks-on-review-for-further--
PR_306571 
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financial positions of much larger banks. Note that the direction of the edges does not represent 
the direction in which the losses spread but rather represents the similarity between banks. For 
example, if a directed edge exists from bank 𝑖 to bank 𝑗, the interpretation is that bank 𝑖 is similar 
to bank 𝑗 in the sense that the market perceives 𝑖 to be exposed to similar difficulties as bank 𝑗 in 
the event of bank 𝑗’s default. 
Figure 3. Illustration of a proximity shock following the default of a bank 
3.2.9 The total loss to each remaining bank 𝑖 is given by 𝐿𝑖,𝑛 = 𝐿𝑖
(1)
+ 𝐿𝑖
(2)
+ 𝐿𝑖,𝑛
(3)
. The 
losses for each bank are subtracted from their respective capital amounts, leading to further bank 
failures whenever 𝐿𝑖,𝑛 ≥ 𝑐𝑖. For each further bank failure, losses due to funding requirements, 
liquidity shocks and proximity shocks are calculated. For each remaining bank in the system, all 
losses are added together to determine the next round of failures. This is repeated until the default 
cascade stops, i.e. until either all banks have defaulted or the remaining banks in the system have 
absorbed all losses. Let 𝜃𝑛 denote the total number of banks that had defaulted because of the 
initial shock of bank 𝑛 (including bank 𝑛). The proportion of banks that have defaulted, say 𝛼𝑛 =
𝜃𝑛
𝑁
 is then calculated. 
3.2.10 The above procedure is repeated for 𝑛 = 1,2, … , 𝑁. The average proportion of 
defaulted banks over the 𝑁 repetitions of the cascade is then calculated, i.e. we calculate 𝛼 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛼𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜃𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 . This is repeated 𝑚 times, with the edges simulated each time. The 
average defaulted fraction over all the simulations is then denoted by ?̅?. For the remainder of the 
paper, we refer to ?̅? as the systemic risk indicator. 
3.3 NETWORK STRUCTURES 
3.3.1 Recall that the network structure is determined by the way that banks are connected 
to one another in the network. We construct a network of trust deterioration, where the edges 
represent paths through which trust is lost in the system. 
3.3.2 As it is not possible to know beforehand which banks will be perceived as being 
affected by another bank’s failure, the edges in the network are assumed to be random and various 
network structures are considered. Even though some structures may be unrealistic, it is of interest 
to include them to consider a wider range of outcomes. This allows for a better understanding of 
the relevance of network structure in a network model based on trust deterioration. 
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3.3.3 Six network structures are investigated based on the probability 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) that a 
connecting edge from bank 𝑖 to bank 𝑗 is present. To take account of heterogeneity between banks, 
we let this probability be dependent on the relative asset sizes of banks. The structures described 
in this section are selected as they are either well known structures found in the network theory 
literature and capture a range of possibilities or facilitate the modelling of core-peripheral 
structures in networks that are not necessarily scale-free. 
3.3.4 Figures 4 to 9 illustrate the behaviour of each structure. The size of a node is 
indicative of the bank’s total asset value. A solid line represents a high probability that the 
associated edge is present, and a dashed, transparent line indicates a lower probability. The 
formulae for determining and standardising the connection probabilities 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) are included in 
APPENDIX C. 
3.3.5 Figure 4 contains the first structure, which is an Erdös-Rényi network and is the 
simplest of all the structures considered. The probability that an edge exists between two nodes is 
independent of the asset sizes and is the same between all banks. 
3.3.6 Figure 5 illustrates the second structure. Here, it is assumed that the probability that 
a large bank causes a loss of trust in any other bank is high. Shocks experienced by smaller banks 
have a small probability of affecting other banks. This structure is termed ‘flight to quality’. Here, 
the market assumed before the shock event that the bigger banks were the most financially sound. 
The failure of a big bank therefore causes widespread panic, affecting most other banks in the 
system. 
3.3.7 A disassortative network structure is included, where banks of dissimilar size are 
more likely to have connecting edges between them. This is illustrated in Figure 6. The assortative 
structure shown in Figure 7 exhibits the opposite behaviour, where banks of similar size are more 
likely to have connections between them. Such structures may not be realistic for banking 
networks. They are included to widen the range of structures and because of the prominent role 
that these networks play in related fields of study such as social networks or ecosystems where 
e.g. ‘opposites attract’. 
3.3.8 The final two structures represent core-peripheral networks, where a network has a 
small, highly connected core (the top tier), with a larger, sparsely connected peripheral (the bottom 
tier). As the South African system consists of a small number of big banks and several small banks, 
it is reasonable to include core-peripheral structures into our range of networks. The Tiered type I 
network is illustrated by Figure 8. Large banks have high probabilities of being linked to one 
another, and small banks lower probabilities of being connected to one another. The probabilities 
of large and small banks being connected to one another lie in between. 
3.3.9 The final structure is termed Tiered type II and is more refined than the previous 
structures. As shown by Figure 9, the probability that: 
– a small bank connects to another small bank is low; 
– a small bank connects to a large bank is also relatively low; 
– a large bank connects to a small bank is high; and 
– a large bank connects to another large bank is also high. 
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Figure 4. Illustration of an Erdös-Rényi 
structure’s connection probabilities 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of a flight to quality 
structure’s connection probabilities 
  
Figure 6. Illustration of a disassortative 
structure’s connection probabilities 
 
Figure 8. Illustration of a Tiered type I 
structure’s connection probabilities 
 
Figure 7. Illustration of an assortative 
structure’s connection probabilities 
 
Figure 9. Illustration of a Tiered type II 
structure’s connection probabilities 
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR REAL WORLD BANKING SYSTEMS 
4.1 APPLYING THE MODEL TO SOUTH AFRICAN BALANCE SHEET DATA 
4.1.1. The different network structures discussed in section 3.3 are compared to one 
another over time. The combined effect of network structure, the system’s interconnectedness and 
the consequences of liquidity shortages and a deterioration of market sentiment on systemic risk 
is investigated. Recall that systemic risk is measured by calculating the probability that a bank 
defaults as a result of a shock to the system. For ease of reference, liquidity risk and the risk of 
loss due to a deterioration of market sentiment are referred to as indirect risk from here onwards. 
This is because losses resulting from these risks are not directly attributable to exposures between 
banks. 
4.1.2. We illustrate how the systemic default indicator changes over time by calculating 
a point in time probability at each month during the investigation period. At each time interval, an 
initial shock of 0,4 is applied to the system. In other words, the bank that suffers the initial loss as 
explained in section 3.2 experiences a loss equal to 40% of its total asset value. Whenever a bank 
defaults, it is assumed that 30% of the shortfall must be covered by the remaining banks, i.e. we 
assume that 𝑢 = 0,3. Four scenarios are considered regarding the interconnectedness and the effect 
of indirect risk factors on systemic risk: 
– Low risk parameters (𝑔(𝑠) = 0,01, 𝑔(𝑚) = 0,01, 𝑔(𝑙) = 0,02 and 𝛿 = 0,01) and a 
moderate level of interconnectedness (?̅? = 0,5). 
– Low risk parameters (𝑔(𝑠) = 0,01, 𝑔(𝑚) = 0,01, 𝑔(𝑙) = 0,02, and 𝛿 = 0,01) with a high 
level of interconnectedness (?̅? = 0,8). 
– High values for the risk parameters (𝑔(𝑠) = 0,015, 𝑔(𝑚) = 0,015, 𝑔(𝑙) = 0,03, and 𝛿 =
0,015) with a moderate level of interconnectedness (?̅? = 0,5). 
– High risk parameters (𝑔(𝑠) = 0,015, 𝑔(𝑚) = 0,015, 𝑔(𝑙) = 0,03, and 𝛿 = 0,015) and a 
high level of interconnectedness (?̅? = 0,8). 
4.1.3. The values for 𝑔(𝑠), 𝑔(𝑚), 𝑔(𝑙) and 𝛿 for the high and low indirect risk scenarios are 
simply a scaling of one another. Note that the parameter associated with the long-term assets is 
higher than for the other maturities. This is done to account for the illiquidity of these assets. It is 
important to note that different results may be obtained with different combinations of these 
parameters. However, it is impractical to consider an arbitrary number of combinations without 
more information regarding realistic values. Therefore only a few combinations are considered in 
this study. 
4.1.4. For the low-risk scenario, the chosen parameter values imply that after each default, 
the short- and medium-term assets of banks are decreased by approximately 1% and the long-term 
assets by 2%. The proximity shock parameter reduces all asset values of banks with a shortest 
distance of 1 to the failing bank by 1%. For the high-risk scenarios, the short- and medium-term 
assets are reduced by 1,5% and the long-term assets by 3%. The proximity shocks decrease all 
assets of banks directly connected to the failing bank by 1,5%. 
4.1.5. Figures 10 to 13 show the relative levels of systemic risk over time for all network 
structures considered in section 3.3. Where the graphs reach a flat baseline just below 0,04, the 
system did not experience any additional defaults over and above the initial default. In those cases, 
the average fraction of defaults experienced in the system is one out of 26. It is noted that the 
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systemic default indicators shown by the graphs are based on hypothetical values of the parameters 
associated with indirect risks and are not necessarily accurate. This is because the focus of this 
study is on the relative risk levels associated with different network structures, and not to calculate 
actual probabilities for these events. 
4.1.6. As expected, higher levels of interconnectedness result in lower levels of 
discrimination between the different structures. The lines in Figures 11 and 13 are closer to one 
another when compared to Figures 10 and 12 respectively. This is because the higher value of ?̅? 
pushes the probabilities 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) to towards one for all structures and hence they become more 
representative of fully connected systems. The levels of risk over time does not change 
significantly when interconnectedness is increased, and the overall shapes of the graphs are 
preserved when increasing the level of connectedness of the system. 
4.1.7. From all four scenarios, it is seen that there is a spike in systemic risk around 
December 2015. This corresponds to the month during which former South African finance 
Minister Nhlanhla Nene was replaced, which was an unexpected and controversial political event 
in South Africa. The local financial market reacted negatively, and the local currency depreciated 
significantly during that period. 
4.1.8. A second spike in systemic risk is observed around June 2016. This increase is less 
prominent in Figures 12 and 13 (where higher risk parameters are used) than in Figures 10 and 11 
(where lower risk parameters are used). This was also a time during which the Rand depreciated 
steeply against the US dollar. This was due a combination of factors, namely a weak economic 
growth outlook, rumours that the former finance Minister was to be arrested and an approaching 
credit review by Standard and Poor to decide whether they will downgrade South Africa’s 
sovereign rating to junk status. During March 2017, former finance Minister Pravin Gordhan was 
also replaced during another controversial political event. This coincides with a sudden increase 
in systemic risk in Figures 10 to 13. 
4.1.9. The prominence of the December 2015 spike may be explained by looking at the 
average balance sheet items over time (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A). At December 2015, the 
relative increase in the average for the short- and long-term assets are much greater compared to 
the CET1 capital. This could, on average, lead to relatively larger losses for the initially shocked 
bank (because this is defined as a proportion of assets) that need to be absorbed by the capital. 
However, the average asset values at June 2016 and March 2017 do not show the same extreme 
behaviour, which could explain why these spikes are less prominent. 
4.1.10.  However, Figures 12 and 13 with high risk parameters show a smaller increase in 
systemic risk. This may be because overall risk levels are higher in these scenarios, thereby 
decreasing the prominence of the spikes. This shows that the level of indirect risk influences which 
events lead to an increase in systemic risk. 
4.1.11. In general, it appears that the importance of the network structure is to a large extent 
influenced by the values chosen for the risk parameters. In the low indirect risk scenarios (Figures 
10 and 11) at times when systemic risk levels are relatively high, the network structures exhibit 
small differences. Otherwise they are virtually indistinguishable from one another. 
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Figure 10. Low indirect risk, moderate 
interconnectedness 
 
Figure 11. Low indirect risk, high 
interconnectedness 
 
Figure 12. High indirect risk, moderate 
interconnectedness 
 
Figure 13. High indirect risk, high 
interconnectedness
4.1.12. For higher risk parameters (Figures 12 and 13), the network structure plays a greater 
role in the level of systemic risk. Overall, the flight to quality structure exhibits the most risk when 
differences between the structures can be seen. From all four scenarios it is seen that the structures 
are mostly consistent regarding directional changes, i.e. the structures’ risk levels move in the same 
direction at each time step, albeit at different rates. The only exception is around September 2016 
in Figures 12 and 13, where the Erdös-Rényi and disassortativeness structures show a slight 
decrease in risk, whereas the other structures show an increase. 
4.1.13. The above results show that the indirect risk parameters can affect how systemic 
risk changes over time. To further illustrate this point, we consider the effect of changing the 
relative values of the indirect risk parameters. A base parameter value of 0,015 is used for all 
indirect risk parameters. These parameter values will be referred to as the base parameters for the 
remainder of the section. The resultant graph of systemic risk over time is shown in Figure 14. 
4.1.14. The effect of increasing any one risk parameter is considered. The liquidity risk 
parameters are each increased to 0,03, where the proximity shock parameter is increased to 0,025. 
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This is because the results are very sensitive to this parameter, which is reasonable as it affects 
assets of all maturities. Therefore, increasing it to 0,03 increases the risk levels too much. The 
level of interconnectedness is kept at 0,5, since it was seen above that increasing the 
interconnectedness does not significantly influence the shape of the graphs. Instead, it brings the 
structures closer to one another. 
4.1.15. Figure 15 shows the effect of increasing only the parameter associated with the 
short-term liquidity losses from 0,015 to 0,03. Figures 16 to 18 show the same results for the 
medium-term, long-term and proximity shock parameters, respectively. Note that Figure 17 is the 
same as Figure 12 but is included again and scaled to facilitate the comparison between graphs. 
 
Figure 14. Systemic risk over time for base parameters of 𝑔(𝑠) = 0,015, 𝑔(𝑚) = 0,015, 𝑔(𝑙) =
0,015 and 𝛿 = 0,015 
4.1.16. From Figures 15 to 18 it is seen that the parameters don’t have the same effect on 
systemic risk. By increasing only the short-term liquidity parameter in Figure 15, the peaks in 
systemic risk are more pronounced than in Figure 14 for the base parameters. Differences between 
the network structures are decreased at the peaks but are more pronounced at the troughs. 
Increasing only the medium-term liquidity parameter (Figure 16) flattens out the graph to such an 
extent that the December 2015 and June 2016 spikes are not distinguishable from other peaks in 
the graph. Only the December 2016 decrease in risk is preserved. Once again, the differences 
between the network structures become greater during the December 2016 dip in risk but are less 
during other months when compared to Figure 14. 
4.1.17. When only the long-term liquidity risk parameter is increased in Figure 17, the 
graph again flattens out to an extent, but the dip in risk levels during December 2016 is preserved. 
Differences between the network structures are generally more pronounced than in Figures 15 and 
17. 
4.1.18. By increasing only the parameter associated with market sentiment, the general 
level of risk increases quicker than for the other parameters. The December 2015 peak becomes 
much more pronounced than in Figures 15 to 17. Despite this parameter being directly related to 
the network structure, the differences between the structures become less. This suggests that the 
effect of the increased emphasis on the parameter related to the network structure is diminished by 
the increase in defaults experienced by all structures. 
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Figure 4. Systemic risk over time for base 
parameters, but with 𝑔(𝑠) = 0,03 
 
Figure 5. Systemic risk over time for base 
parameters, but with 𝑔(𝑚) = 0,03
 
Figure 6. Systemic risk over time for base 
parameters, but with 𝑔(𝑙) = 0,03 
 
Figure 7. Systemic risk over time for base 
parameters, but with 𝛿 = 0,025
4.1.19. The differences between Figures 15, 16 and 17 are likely because of differences in 
asset values for different maturities between banks and within each bank. This is because the three 
liquidity parameters enter the model in the same way via reductions in the associated asset values. 
Therefore, networks derived from different countries’ banking systems will likely differ in the way 
that they react to changes in network structure and liquidity risk parameters. For regulators, it is 
important to note that conclusions reached for one banking system will not necessarily hold for 
another. 
4.1.20. The results show that both network structure and indirect risk are important in 
determining the level of risk present in the system. Network structure can affect the degree to 
which market disturbances fuel systemic risk. Determining parameters associated with liquidity 
risk for different asset types and market sentiment is important for network models of systemic 
risk, since these can significantly influence results. 
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4.1.21. To understand how the network structure affects how the different banks in the 
system contribute to systemic risk, it is useful to consider how 𝛼𝑛 (defined in ¶3.2.10 as the 
proportion of nodes that default if 𝑛 is the initially shocked bank) varies with the asset value of 
bank 𝑛. Let ?̅?𝑛 denote the average of 𝛼𝑛 over 2000 simulations. It is reasonable to expect the 
default of larger banks to have a greater knock-on effect on the system compared to smaller banks 
and hence ?̅?𝑛 is expected to be higher for larger banks. This is confirmed by Figures 19 and 20 
below, which are based on the Erdӧs-Rényi network structure, with Figure 20 based on balance 
sheet data as at March 2017. Figure 19 shows the average value of ?̅?𝑛 for large, medium, small 
and very small banks. Figure A.1 in Appendix A was used to determine the groups. The four largest 
banks in the system are included in the ‘large’ group, the fifth largest bank in the ‘medium’ group, 
the sixth to thirteenth largest banks (Capitec Bank to African Bank) in the ‘small’ group, and the 
remainder in the ‘very small’ group. Figure 20 shows a scatterplot of ?̅?𝑛 against the logarithm of 
𝑛’s asset value. Both figures support the expectation that large banks have a greater knock-on 
effect when they default. It is interesting to note that all the other structures lead to the same 
conclusions (the graphs are omitted to avoid repetitiveness). This shows that the model tends to 
behave as expected in this regard irrespective of the network structure. 
 
Figure 19. Systemic risk indicator by bank 
size for the Erdӧs-Rényi network 
 
Figure 20. Scatterplot of ?̅?𝑛 against the 
natural logarithm of bank 𝑛’s assets for the 
Erdӧs-Rényi network 
4.2 IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS 
4.2.1. The network structures behaved similarly for most of the cases considered here. 
The levels of risk were generally similar for high levels of connectivity and for lower levels of 
indirect risk. However, the differences in risk levels between the structures were not consistent 
over time. There were many time periods when the risk levels were very close to one another. 
Where the structures’ risk levels did differ from one another, they mostly followed similar trends 
over time. This suggests that the changes in systemic risk detected by the model is not highly 
dependent on the network structure. The general relationship between a bank’s size and its 
contribution to systemic risk was also the same for the different structures. These observations 
have the following implications: 
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(1) The materiality of network structure is firstly influenced by the objective of the network 
model. If the objective is to accurately determine the level of risk in the system, then the 
network structure does not make a significant difference for highly interconnected systems. 
For lower levels of interconnectedness, there are time periods when the network structures 
exhibit similar risk levels. However, this is highly dependent on the risk parameter values. 
(2) If the objective is to detect changes in systemic risk, the materiality of network structure 
decreases. This means that the uncertainty around the initial shock to the system (and hence 
the resulting path through which losses spread) is less problematic. 
(3) Network models are capable of capturing the intuitive relationship between a bank’s size 
and the consequences of its default for a wide range of network structures. 
4.2.2. The results show that the risk parameters significantly influence the extent to which 
network structure affects systemic risk. The liquidity risk mechanism employed by the model 
affects the assets of all banks and therefore is not directly related to the network structure. 
Nevertheless, small changes in the liquidity risk parameters have a non-trivial influence on the 
relative differences in risk exhibited by the structures. 
4.2.3. Furthermore, each risk parameter influences the results in its own way. For 
example, increasing the short-term liquidity parameter emphasised the December 2015 and June 
2016 increases in risk, whereas the other liquidity parameters reduced the significance of these 
spikes. This either means that the model is not able to detect increases in risk for certain parameter 
values, or that the system does not experience a significant increase in systemic risk during times 
of market turmoil for some liquidity scenarios. For example, the high liquidity risk scenarios (see 
Figures 12 and 13) might increase the risk levels during all months to such an extent that the effect 
of weak economic conditions are diminished. 
4.2.4. The above observations have the following implications for the modelling of 
systemic risk using a network approach: 
(1) Empirical studies that aim to determine the level of systemic risk should take care to 
calibrate the liquidity risk parameters to levels appropriate for the system being considered. 
The difficulty of calibrating these parameters is a drawback of such a network approach to 
modelling systemic risk. As incidents of bank closure/liquidation can be scarce, one may 
have to work with few datapoints. As such it would not be possible to calibrate the 
parameters precisely, but it could be possible to determine a realistic range for the required 
parameters. One can consider the balance sheet positions of all banks before and after each 
closure/liquidation incident to measure the size of any shrinkages in the remaining banks’ 
balance sheets. 
(2) A finer division of assets is recommended. The fact that the liquidity risk parameters each 
had a different effect on the model output suggests that the classification of assets can be a 
material aspect of such a study. 
(3) Since the model showed increases in systemic risk during times of market turmoil, it shows 
that network models of systemic risk may be valuable modelling tools. A great advantage 
of this is that publicly available balance sheet information can be used to model systemic 
risk, thereby avoiding the need to obtain confidential trading information. It may be by 
chance that the model detected increases in systemic risk due to balance sheet fluctuations. 
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This warrants further investigation to determine with greater certainty whether the model 
can accurately identify potential crises. 
5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 We use a novel network approach to model systemic risk in South Africa by considering 
how the liquidity problems and default of one bank can lead to the market frictions such as losing 
trust in the financial wellbeing of other banks. Here, the type of event that leads to the default of 
the first bank is likely to infer the network structure. As this cannot be determined beforehand, and 
a lack of past systemic crises make liquidity parameters difficult to determine, we consider the 
effect of network structure and liquidity risk on the results. 
5.2 The network structure’s influence on systemic risk was considered under different 
circumstances and over time. The general trend is the same for all network structures, showing 
that the model may detect fluctuations in systemic risk even if the true network structure is 
unknown. The differences between the network structures are influenced by the effect of liquidity 
risk and the losses due to negative investor sentiment. The trends in systemic risk over time is 
sensitive to changes in the parameters associated with these risks. This shows that any investigation 
regarding systemic risk in banking networks must incorporate indirect losses such as losses due to 
liquidity problems and a deterioration of market sentiment, since these significantly influence the 
results. 
5.3 The effect of indirect losses has a significant effect on how the system reacts to changes in 
structure and interconnectedness. This indicates that the calibration of these parameters is 
important when making decisions based on network models of systemic risk. The importance of 
this is emphasized by the fact that systemic risk levels over time behave significantly different 
depending on the combination of all the parameters used. It is imperative or regulators to 
incorporate and accurately model these effects when assessing the effect of proposed regulatory 
changes. 
5.4 Despite the problems associated with determining the correct network structure and 
liquidity risk parameters, such models can be useful. These models are simple, easy to understand 
and makes use of publicly available balance sheet data. The framework presented here can be 
useful to answer ‘what-if’ questions that arise in practice and to give insight into what might 
happen to the system given an appropriate network. The framework in itself can be used to generate 
a wide range of output, for example one can investigate a range of different risk measures (average 
capital lost, average proportion of asset value lost by the system etc., and test for correlations 
between this and the size of the initially defaulted bank. 
5.5 During the time frame considered here, the network model detected increases in systemic 
risk at times when the economy experienced unexpected market disturbances. An important 
avenue for future research is to determine whether this is by chance, or whether the model 
accurately predicts the probability that a crisis can occur. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
the model does not forecast times of distress, but instead provides a proxy for the level of risk at a 
point in time. In other words, the true proportion of banks defaulting following a shock to the 
system is not determined, but rather a value that increases or decreases along with it. 
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5.6 Note that this investigation solely focused on relative changes in systemic risk and is not 
meant to provide an accurate estimate of the probability that a bank defaults following an initial 
shock to the system. Important avenues for future research include assigning banks different 
probabilities of receiving an initial shock and including the possibility that such a shock may affect 
more than one bank at the same time. This should be done parallel to modelling the macro-
economic environment over time. In this case a lender of last resort and the cost of regulation can 
be included. Furthermore, the effect of leverage can be modelled more explicitly in the presence 
of a macro-economic environment. Finally, the interaction between the banking sector and other 
financial institutions (e.g. insurance and investment companies) should be included in future work. 
For further work, it is important to consider a range of different risk measures and to test whether 
the same conclusions hold. Other important directions for future work include considering a wider 
range of structures, a finer division of assets and using a networks-on-networks approach to 
incorporate a range of contagion mechanisms. 
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APPENDIX A.  
ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
 
Figure A.1. The distribution of assets in the banking sector as at 31 March 2017 
 
Figure A.2. Relative increases of the average balance sheet items in the system   
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APPENDIX B.  
BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION 
Table B.1. Division of assets according to term  
Short Term Assets 
– Central bank money and gold. 
– Deposits with, and loans and advances to banks. 
– Loans granted to the SARB and other institutions under resale agreements. 
– Foreign currency deposits, loans and advances. 
– One third of marketable government stock that have an unexpired maturity of less than 3  
years. 
– Derivative instruments assigned to the short-term asset category according to the rules in  
section 3.1. 
Medium Term Assets 
– Instalment sales. 
– Credit-card debtors. 
– Overdrafts, loans and advances to the private sector. 
– Bankers’ acceptances (Treasury bills, SARB bills, promissory notes, commercial paper  
and Land Bank bills). 
– Clients’ liabilities per contra. 
– Remittances in transit. 
– Current income tax receivables and deferred income tax assets. 
– One third of marketable government stock that have an unexpired maturity of less than 3  
years. 
– Derivative instruments assigned to the medium-term asset category according to the rules  
in section 3.1. 
Long Term Assets 
– Redeemable preference shares. 
– Leasing transactions. 
– Mortgage advances. 
– Overdrafts, loans and advances to the public sector. 
– Non-marketable government stock. 
– All marketable government stock excluding two thirds of those stock that have an  
unexpired maturity of less than 3 years. 
– Debentures and other interest-bearing security investments of private sector. 
– All equity investments. 
– Derivative instruments assigned to the long-term asset category according to the rules in  
section 3.1. 
– Other investments. 
– Non-financial assets. 
– Retirement benefit assets. 
– Assets acquired or bought to protect an advance or investment. 
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Table B.2. Available unweighted ratios of CET1 to total assets at month-end for all registered 
banks
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APPENDIX C.  
CONNECTION PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT NETWORK 
STRUCTURES 
C.1. Let 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) be the probability that bank 𝑖 has an outgoing edge to bank 𝑗 and let 𝑎𝑗 denote 
the asset value of bank 𝑗. As banks cannot be connected to themselves, 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗)  =  0 whenever 𝑖 =
𝑗. For the rest of this discussion, assume that 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑁}, with 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. The different network 
structures are then specified as follows: 
1. Erdös-Rénji: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑝 
2. Flight to quality: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝑎𝑗
max
𝑘
{𝑎𝑘}
 
3. Disassortativeness: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) =
max {
𝑎𝑖
𝑎𝑗
,
𝑎𝑗
𝑎𝑖
}
max
𝑘≠𝑚
{
𝑎𝑘
𝑎𝑚
,
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑘
}
 
4. Assortativeness: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) =
min{𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗}
max{𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗}
 
5. Tiered type I: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑗
max
𝑘≠𝑚
{𝑎𝑘 + 𝑎𝑚}
 
6. Tiered type II: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑗 + max {𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑗 , 0}
3 ∙ max {𝑎𝑘}
 
C.2. For a given set of asset values, the average number of edges will differ between the 
different structures. For comparative purposes, it is important to work with similar levels of 
connectedness between the different structures. In addition to this, it is important to have a 
systematic way of varying the level of connectedness in the network to investigate its effect on 
systemic risk. 
C.3. For these reasons, a method for scaling the probabilities is required. Such a method will 
need to provide scaled probabilities that remain in the range [0,1]. It must further allow one to 
standardise the different structures to represent the same level of connectivity between them. The 
level of connectivity is measured by means of the average probability that an edge exists in the 
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system (i.e. the average probability that one bank is exposed to a loss of trust in case of default of 
another). 
C.4. Let ?̅?0 be the average probability that an edge exists in the system based on any one of the 
above six structures. Then  
?̅?0 =
∑ ∑ 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)
. 
Note that the entries for which 𝑖 = 𝑗 are all zero are not included in the calculation of this average, 
and they are to remain zero after scaling. Let ?̅? be the desired average connection probability. The 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) probabilities then needs to be scaled in order to yield this average. Suppose ?̅?0 > ?̅?. Then 
we choose  
?̅?(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗)
?̅?
?̅?0
 
and if ?̅?0 < ?̅?, then  
?̅?(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (1 − 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗))
1 − ?̅?
1 − ?̅?0
. 
The new connection probabilities ?̅?(𝑖, 𝑗) will then have the required average ?̅?. 
